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The McLachlin Court and the 
Charter in 2012 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012 — the year of its 30th anniversary — Canadians learned that 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is now more influential 
abroad than the U.S. Constitution.2 Despite that boost, last year’s 
anniversary lacked the celebratory verve of earlier milestones.3 The 
federal government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper snubbed 
the occasion, refusing to extend the courtesy of birthday wishes or rehearse 
the customary platitudes which applaud the virtues of constitutional 
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1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 D. Law & M. Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the U.S. Constitution” (2012) 
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762 [hereinafter “Law & Versteeg”], as reported by Adam Liptak in “‘We the 




 In 1987, for example, a postage stamp was issued in honour of the Charter’s fifth 
anniversary. More recently, the 25th anniversary in 2007 featured several conferences and 
publications; see, e.g., J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice, 
Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008); J.E. Magnet & B. Adell, eds., 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms After Twenty-Five Years (Markham, ON: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2009); “The Charter @ 25” (2007) Policy Options, online: Institute for Research on Public 
Policy” <http://www.irpp.org/en/po/the-charter-25/>. Last year the Constitutional Cases conference 
celebrated the Charter’s 30th anniversary with two volumes of the Supreme Court Law Review: 
B. Berger & J. Stribopoulos, eds., Unsettled Legacy: Thirty Years of Criminal Jurisprudence under 
the Charter (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2012) and 57 S.C.L.R. (2d); J. Cameron & 
S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2011 (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) [hereinafter “Constitutional 
Cases 2011”] (anniversary volume). 
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rights belonging to and protecting all Canadians. The prime minister 
lamely explained that such encomiums were inappropriate in light of 
Quebec’s unresolved objection to patriation and constitutional reform 
30 years ago, in 1982.4 
A key feature of the Osgoode Hall Law School Constitutional Cases 
conference, which celebrated its 15th anniversary last year in 2012, is its 
annual review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.5 Quantitative and 
qualitative in scope, this review has provided the kind of analytical con-
tinuity that is especially helpful in understanding the McLachlin Court’s 
response to the Charter over time, from 2000 — the year Beverley 
McLachlin was appointed Canada’s first female Chief Justice — to the 
present. A historical survey of the review articles since the year 2000 
shows that, until recently, the rate of success for Charter claims in the 
McLachlin Court has been relatively constant at about 45 per cent.6 That 
rate dropped in 2010 and 2011 and for the third year in a row, this year’s 
success rate remains fixed at about 20 per cent.7  
Meanwhile, the Charter’s promises continue to be undermined by the 
federal government’s legislative agenda. Through a variety of measures 
which have been enacted or are moving through the legislative process, 
the government has declared that it has little intention of practising evi-
dence-based policymaking, and has also signalled that its lawmaking will 
not be inhibited by undue solicitude for the protection of rights. This de-
scribes the federal government’s approach, at present, on issues affecting 
the rights of the accused, immigrants and refugees, those with mental 
disorders, and Canadians more generally.8  
                                                                                                             
4 J. Ditchburn, “Constitutional ‘Divisions’ Keep Harper from Celebrating the Charter”, 
April 16, 2012, The Globe and Mail online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ 
constitutional-divisions-keep-harper-from-celebrating-charter/article4100714/>. 
5 The Constitutional Cases conference was instituted in 1997 to provide annual analysis 
and commentary on the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence. Since 2001 the 
Supreme Court Law Review has published the conference papers annually; see York Digital 
Journals: <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/sclr>. Until this year, the annual review paper was 
under the leadership of Patrick Monahan, a long-time Osgoode colleague and founder of the 
conference. Monahan accepted an appointment as Deputy Minister of the Ontario Attorney General 
in fall of 2012. His review articles, which frequently are co-authored, provide quantitative data on 
the Charter’s rate of success in the McLachlin Court. See references, infra. See also P. Monahan, 
“‘In the Public Interest’: Understanding the Special Role of the Government Lawyer” in B. Berger, 
J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds., (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2012”]. 
6 See infra, note 21. 
7 See infra text and accompanying footnotes 30 (2011), 31 (2010), and 17 (2012). 
8 See, e.g., Bill C-10, Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 (omnibus 
legislation containing nine statutes); Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 
S.C. 2012, c. 17 (omnibus legislation amending several statutes which deal with immigration and 
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In combination, the Court’s lessened engagement and the federal 
government’s attitude of indifference create an unhealthy climate for the 
protection of Charter rights. It may be premature to sound the alarm, as 
there is nuance in the jurisprudence and, on the longer view, the courts 
have acquitted themselves well in stepping up to the Charter mandate. 
Yet it is elementary that rights are fragile, and well known that their pro-
tection demands vigilance. As in the past, this year’s review provides a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 2012 constitutional jurispru-
dence. In doing so, the discussion underlines the Charter’s downward 
trend and poses broader questions about the significance of recent juris-
prudential patterns.  
The Charter’s fluidity over time is sustaining. From that vantage, it 
might not be concerning that the Charter is momentarily in stall, so long 
as it can safely be assumed that it will pull out and re-ascend. Pending 
that momentum shift, forbearance and persistence in urging the Charter 
onward will have to suffice. Though patience may be rewarded, it is un-
known at this point whether the current stall is a passing or more lasting 
condition. The momentum shift and re-ascent may not happen; if and 
when it does the Charter’s next iteration will likely look quite different.  
As this paper shows, these dynamics hint that the next iteration may 
already be embedding in legal and political culture. It appears, today, that 
the rights-enforcing energy of the Charter’s early years is largely spent, 
and as that energy wanes, a post-transformative view of the Charter is 
evolving. That view conceptualizes the Charter as more a middle-ground 
document than an aspirational instrument of progress. The Court plays a 
less active role in this iteration, serving more as a yeoman of rights than 
a leader in thinking deeply about the Charter’s promises and how they 
can be kept. Rights protection is a dutiful but uninspired task in this ac-
count and is defined by a quest for compromise and practicality, over 
and above principle and the commitments it demands. More passive in 
nature, the yeoman’s role glosses, elides and slips around searching ques-
tions about the scope and meaning of rights.  
If the Charter has been fluid from the start, this iteration-in-the-making 
presents an unsettling view of rights protection in Canada today. This 
year’s review begins with a survey of the 2012 jurisprudence by the 
                                                                                                             
refugee matters); Bill C-30, Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act (creating 
telecommunications powers so controversial the “Internet spying bill” was withdrawn); Bill C-54, 
Not Criminally Responsible Act, 2nd reading May 28, 2013 (amending Part XX.1 of the Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). 
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numbers, and comments on data that show the Charter trending down for 
the last three years. From there, the review takes form as a hybrid between 
the annual reviews of earlier years, and a “foreword” piece that comments 
thematically — and critically — on the Court’s work. Those themes are 
accessed, in part, through pointed analysis of two key decisions on the 
Charter’s fundamental freedoms in this period: R. v. Khawaja9 and 
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott.10 In turn, that 
analysis builds a platform for reflections on the Charter’s place in our legal 
and political culture, 30 years later. If it is histrionic to ask whether the 
Charter still matters — for surely it does — questions about why, how and 
in what ways are not misplaced at this point in time.11  
II. 2012: BY THE NUMBERS 
Officially, the McLachlin Court’s constitutional output in 2012 was 
11 decisions on a docket of 75 cases, 10 of which arose under the Charter 
and one other under the division of powers.12 With two double counting 
under section 7 and the fundamental freedoms, the Court considered the 
Charter’s legal rights seven times,13 addressed its fundamental freedoms 
                                                                                                             
9 [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”]. 
10 [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, 409 Sask. R. 75 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”]. 
11 See H. Arthurs & B. Arnold, “Does the Charter Matter?” (2005) 11 Rev. Const. Studies 
37 (explaining that progress under the Charter has been “modest, halting, non-existent, and, in some 
cases, negative” and stating that the Charter “does not much matter in the precise sense that it has 
not ... significantly altered the reality of life in Canada”). 
12 On the division of powers, see Tessier Ltée v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la 
sécurité du travail), [2012] S.C.J. No. 23, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (upholding provincial 
jurisdiction over labour relations for stevedoring). 
13 R. v. Tse, [2012] S.C.J. No. 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tse”] (s. 8); R. 
v. Bellusci, [2012] S.C.J. No. 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bellusci”] (s. 24(1)); R. 
v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”] (ss. 8 and 24(2)); R. 
v. St-Onge Lamoureux, [2012] S.C.J. No. 57, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 187 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “St-Onge”] 
(s. 11(d)); R. v. Nedelcu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nedelcu”] 
(s. 13); R. v. Aucoin, [2012] S.C.J. No. 66, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 408 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Aucoin”] (ss. 8 
and 24(2)); R. v. Khawaja, supra, note 9 (s. 7); R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 
726 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “S. (N.)”] (s. 7). For commentary on the legal rights in this year’s volume, 
see N. Hasan, “Three Theories of ‘Principles of Fundamental Justice’”; A. Klein, “The Arbitrariness 
in ‘Arbitrariness’ (And Overbreadth and Disproportionality): Principle and Democracy in Section 7 
of the Charter”; H. Stewart, R. v. Khawaja: At the Limits of Fundamental Justice”; D. Stuart, 
“Vagueness, Inconsistency and Less Respect for Charter Rights of Accused at the Supreme Court in 
2012-2013”; and V. MacDonnell, “The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal 
Cases”, Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5. 
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in three instances,14 and looked at one issue under mobility rights.15 The 
claim failed six times, succeeded twice, and was mixed in two cases; all 
told, then, the Charter’s 2012 success rate in raw terms was 20 per cent.16 
Rounding the picture out are six non-Charter decisions on rights. In 
that group, the claim succeeded three times on questions relating to Abo-
riginal sentencing, third party standing to intervene and discrimination 
under human rights laws; in other cases the rights-based claim failed on 
issues of elections law and expressive freedom, and was mixed on an 
open justice question.17 Three decisions released in early 2013 also de-
serve mention in this review, because the retirement of Deschamps J. in 
August of 2012 triggered a six-month deadline for decision-making to be 
completed in the appeals she heard. While the equality and expressive 
freedom claims in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. and Saskatchewan 
(Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott suffered losses, Manitoba Métis 
Federation v. Canada produced a more positive, though mixed, disposi-
                                                                                                             
14 L. (S.) v. Commission Scolaire des Chênes, [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “L. (S.)”] (s. 2(a)); R. v. Khawaja, id. (s. 2(a), (b) and (d)); S. (N.), id. (s. 2(a)). 
Khawaja and S. (N.) engaged legal rights and the fundamental freedoms together. See R. Agarwal & 
C. Di Carlo, “The Importance of Context: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Decision in R. v. S. (N.)”, Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5. 
15 Sriskandarajah v. United States of America, [2012] S.C.J. No. 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sriskandarajah”] (s. 7; mobility rights). 
16 The claim failed in L. (S.), Cole, Aucoin, Nedelcu, Khawaja and Sriskandarajah, 
succeeded in Tse and Bellusci, and was mixed in St-Onge Lamoureux (partial success) and S. (N.) 
(claim remitted for decision on the correct Charter standard).  
17 R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”] 
(Aboriginal sentencing); see J. Gevikoglu, “Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous 
Identity in Sentencing”, and M-E. Sylvestre, “The (Re)discovery of the Proportionality Principle in 
Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of Collective Responses”; Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, 
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 524 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Downtown Eastside”] (public interest standing); see R. 
Sharpe, “Access to Charter Justice” (keynote presentation); Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 
[2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moore”] (discrimination); see R. 
Charney & S. Kraicer, “Moore v. British Columbia: A Good IDEA?”; Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] 
S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Opitz”] (elections law); see Y. Dawood, 
“Democracy and Dissent: Judicial Review of the Political and Constitutional Aspects of the 
Electoral System” [hereinafter “Dawood”]; Doré v. Barreau du Quebec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”] (administrative law; expressive freedom); see A. 
Cameron & P. Daly, “Furthering Substantive Equality Through Administrative Law: Charter Values 
in Education”; and H. Kong, “Doré, Proportionality and the Virtues of Judicial Craft”; and B. (A.) v. 
Bragg Communications Inc., [2012] S.C.J. No. 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bragg 
Communications”] (anonymity and publication ban), Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5 
(publishing all the articles cited in this footnote). Note also that the claim in Moore succeeded on the 
question of discrimination but not on the question of broad systemic remedies. 
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tion under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.18 Counting these 
cases raises the Charter output to 12, but drops the success rate to about 
16 per cent. Arithmetic that presents a blunt picture can be qualified, but 
only so far, and it is an unavoidable conclusion that the Charter fared 
poorly at the Court in 2012.19  
An annual quantitative analysis of the Charter jurisprudence is one of 
the conference’s many contributions over the years. According to the 
data from 2000 to the present, Charter claims succeeded in the first 
10 years of the McLachlin Court at a rate of about 45 per cent, on average.20 
There have been wobbles along the way and some years do not fit the 
profile, like 2008, when the success rate soared to 70 per cent,21 and 
2005 and 2007, when it dipped to 20 per cent and 25 per cent, respec-
tively.22 This has been the trajectory of Charter decision-making up to 
2010, with rates of success in other years, as follows: 30 per cent 
                                                                                                             
18 Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Quebec v. A.”] (equality); see B. Ryder, “The Strange Double Life of Canadian 
Equality Rights” in Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5; Whatcott, supra, note 10 (expressive 
freedom); see M. Freiman, “Hate Speech and the Reasonable Supreme Court of Canada” [hereinafter 
“Freiman”]; C. Zwibel, “Reconciling Rights: The Whatcott Case as Missed Opportunity” 
[hereinafter “Zwibel”] in Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5; and Manitoba Métis Federation 
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 355 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Manitoba Métis”] (s. 35 Aboriginal rights). Note that Quebec v. A. took 12 months to decide; 
Whatcott and Manitoba Métis each were 16 months between hearing and decision, and Deschamps J. 
was unable to participate in either as a result. Compare R. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2013] 
S.C.J. No. 16, 356 D.L.R. (4th) 195 (S.C.C.), which is not considered in the 2012 jurisprudence — 
despite being a Charter success, because it is truly a 2013 decision, having been heard late in 2012 
and decided in 2013. 
19 As noted, the result was mixed in a couple of instances, supra, note 16, and how 
Whatcott, id., should be characterized, in win and loss terms, can be debated. 
20 P. Monahan & J. Yap, “Constitutional Cases 2009: An Overview” (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 3, at 4 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2009”] (stating that, up to 2009, the McLachlin Court 
allowed “63 of 139 Charter claims for an overall success rate of 45 per cent during the decade”). 
21 In discussing 2008, in which the Charter enjoyed the highest success rate since 1985, 
Monahan and Yap explain that when 2008’s success is read against 2007, when Charter claimants 
only prevailed in three of 12 cases or 25 per cent of the time, the two-year success rate remained at 
45 per cent, “consistent with the McLachlin average”, and “yet another downward trend from 2007 
was balanced out in 2008”. P. Monahan & J. Yap, “Constitutional Cases 2008: An Overview” 
(2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 4 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2008”]. 
22 P. Monahan & C. Kurtz, “The Supreme Court of Canada in 2005: The Year in Review” 
(2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 4 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2005”] (noting the departure from 
recent experience under the McLachlin Court); P. Monahan & J. Gotowiec, “Constitutional Cases 
2007: An Overview” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 4 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2007”] 
(noting that, at 58, the Court decided the lowest number of cases in 2007 since 1975, and further 
observing that the Court “was not particularly receptive” to the Charter and that the 25 per cent 
success rate indicated a decline from the average success rate of the recent past). 
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(2000);23 50 per cent (2001);24 63 per cent (2002);25 65 per cent (2003);26 
41 per cent (2004);27 70 per cent (2008);28 and 40 per cent (2009).29  
Against those numbers, it is revealing that the success rate for the 
Charter has not risen above 20 per cent since 2010. In 2011 there were 19 
constitutional decisions on an output of 75 decisions, and in 11 arising 
directly under the Charter, the claim succeeded no more than twice, at a 
rate of 18 per cent.30 The year before, in 2010, the Supreme Court de-
cided 25 constitutional cases, and of the 17 that engaged the Charter 
there was a positive result in only three instances, or 18 per cent of the 
cases once more.31 From that perspective, the 2012 rate of 20 per cent is 
not anomalous, but rather conforms to the Court’s pattern of Charter de-
cision-making in the last three years. 
The quantum of cases decided annually also provides a useful measure 
of the Charter’s activity level at the Supreme Court. Another pattern that 
has been identified and discussed is the McLachlin Court’s declining 
docket, both generally and on Charter claims as well. Monahan first 
noted a drop in 2001, from approximately 111 decisions annually during 
                                                                                                             
23 P. Monahan, “Constitutional Cases 2000: An Overview” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
3 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2000”]. 
24 P. Monahan, “Constitutional Cases 2001: An Overview” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 2 
[hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2001”] (noting that, at 50 per cent, the 2002 Charter jurisprudence 
equals the highest success rate for claims in the last decade). 
25 P. Monahan & N. Blum, “Constitutional Cases 2002: An Overview” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 3 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2002”]. 
26 P. Monahan & J. Cameron, “Constitutional Cases 2003: An Overview” (2004) 
24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 2 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2003”] (commenting that the McLachlin 
Court “continues to be extremely receptive to Charter claims”, noting a marked increase in the 
success rate of claims, and noting an overall success rate of 53 per cent since the McLachlin Court’s 
inception). 
27 P. Monahan & E. Van Dyk, “Constitutional Cases 2004: An Overview” (2005) 
24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 2 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2004”]. 
28 Monahan & Yap, Constitutional Cases 2008, supra, note 21, at 3 (stating also that this 
was the highest success rate since 1985). 
29 Monahan & Yap, Constitutional Cases 2009, supra, note 20. Note that numbers for 2006 
are not available because the 25th anniversary program in 2007 did not provide an annual overview. 
30 P. Monahan & C. Sethi, “Constitutional Cases 2011: An Overview”, in Constitutional 
Cases 2011, supra, note 3, at 5 (stating that “[a]lthough the sample size is small, this success rate is 
below the McLachlin Court’s average of 41 per cent for Charter claims over the last decade (68 out 
of 167 such cases, including the 2011 cases”)). Note also that although 16 cases are included in the 
inventory, 11 arose under the Charter and the other five which did not are mentioned and discussed 
nonetheless because they engaged Charter values.  
31 P. Monahan & C. Sethi, “Constitutional Cases 2010: An Overview” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 3, at 5 [hereinafter “Constitutional Cases 2010”] (noting that the success rate in 2010 was well 
below the McLachlin Court’s average of 42 per cent — based on 66 of 156 cases since 2000). 
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the 1990s to an output of 72 that year.32 Since then, the Court’s output 
dipped to 58 in 2006 and 70 in 2008, which at the time was the second 
lowest in a decade. It fell below 70 again in 2010, when the Court de-
cided 69 cases. From a high of 91 in 2001 to a low of 58 in 2006, the 
numbers confirm Monahan and Yap’s 2009 conclusion of “a general 
downward trend” in the McLachlin Court’s annual output over a 10-year 
period.33 The Charter numbers have also varied, though less dramatically, 
from a low of 10 decisions in 2000, 2007 and 2012, to a high of 19 in 
2001. In other years of low Charter output, the success rates for claims 
— at 30 per cent in 2000 and 70 per cent in 2007 — were higher than 
2012’s 20 per cent.  
Numbers that provide useful information should not be treated as fet-
ish, and nor should their significance be exaggerated. In considering the 
downward trend, it is worth remembering that the McLachlin Court’s 
pre-2010 historic rate compares favourably with data from the 1990s, 
which show a swing, from a low Charter success rate of 21 per cent in 
1993 to a high of 50 per cent in 1997, albeit on a higher volume of con-
stitutional decision-making.34 As well, qualitative results and breakthroughs 
can offset or compensate for modest numbers; it is telling, in that regard, that 
the McLachlin Court has issued one or more landmark decisions in almost 
every year since 2000, including those with modest rates of success for 
Charter claims.35 Another element in assessing the Court’s work is whether 
and in what cases it achieved consensus, and whether, why and with what 
                                                                                                             
32 Monahan, Constitutional Cases 2001, supra, note 24, at 3. 
33 Monahan & Yap, Constitutional Cases 2009, supra, note 20, at 4. That trend is now a 
pattern. In 2010 the Court decided 69 cases; in 2011 the number was 71; and in 2012, as indicated 
above, the number was 75. 
34 See Table 1 in Monahan, Constitutional Cases 2001, supra, note 24, at 5. 
35 In 2005, for example, the Charter rate of success was relatively low, at 20 per cent, and 
“while in percentage terms the Court may have appeared unreceptive to Charter claims”, by far “the 
most significant decisions of the year” and “potentially of the decade” was Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (adopting a novel 
interpretation of s. 7 by plurality opinion and finding that Quebec restrictions on access to private 
health insurance violated the Canadian Charter and Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, 
R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”]); Monahan & Kurtz, Constitutional Cases 2005, 
supra, note 22, at 5. Though the 2012 jurisprudence did not yield a landmark, 2011 and 2010 
produced significant decisions, including Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) (s. 7 and a constitutional exemption); 
R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.) (administrative tribunals and their 
Charter jurisdiction); Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (S.C.C.) 
(remedies; Charter damages); Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] S.C.J. No. 41, 
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) (journalist-source privilege). 
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incidence the judges have disagreed.36 Not surprisingly, the rate of dis-
sent has also varied over the years.37 
Much can be said, by way of qualitative analysis, about levels of 
agreement and disagreement in judicial decision-making, and this year’s 
conference volume includes commentary on the nature and signifi-
cance of dissent.38 In 2012, the Court was unanimous in Tse, Khawaja, 
Sriskandarajah and Bellusci, as well as in four of the six non-Charter 
rights decisions, but divided in six of the 10 Charter cases, two of the 
non-Charter rights decisions, and two of the three early 2013 decisions.39 
As might be expected, dissenting and concurring opinions reveal healthy 
debate on the issues; examples in this review period include S. (N.), con-
cerning a witness’s right to wear a niqab and the accused’s right of full 
answer and defence; Nedelcu, testing the scope of self-incrimination un-
der section 13; Quebec v. A., seeking equality under section 15 for 
partners in common law unions that dissolve; and Métis Federation, ask-
ing for judicial declarations on honour of the Crown and breach of 
fiduciary duty.  
Elsewhere, though differences of opinion were expected to emerge in 
two high stakes cases on fundamental freedom, both were decided by 
                                                                                                             
36 For conference papers this year that assess the Court’s work on questions of 
proportionality, see C. Bredt & H. Pessione, “The Death of Oakes: Time for a Rights-Specific 
Approach”; J. McGill, “Section 15(2), Ameliorative Programs, and Proportionality Review”; and 
D. Schneiderman, “Judging in Secular Times” in Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5. 
37 On the numbers, compare 2001, where Monahan reported a rate of 82 per cent unanimity 
in the Court’s decisions, “the highest in the past 15 years” with a 50 per cent Charter success rate 
that year, and 2007, where Monahan and Gotowiec found “[j]ust 63% of judgments as being 
unanimous” and commented that this level of agreement was “the lowest since the mid-1990s and a 
departure from the McLachlin Court’s overall average of 75%”. Monahan, Constitutional Cases 
2001, supra, note 24, at 4; Monahan & Gotowiec, Constitutional Cases 2007, supra, note 22, at 4. 
Note also that the per cent numbers on unanimity reference the year’s decisions and not the Charter 
subset. 
38 C. Mathen, “The Upside of Dissent in Equality Jurisprudence” in Constitutional Cases 
2012, supra, note 5; Dawood, supra, note 17; D. Rankin & M. Jamal, “Dissents and Concurrences: 
Seven Debates in Charter Jurisprudence” in Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5. 
39 The Court divided in these Charter cases: L. (S.), supra, note 14 (LeBel, Fish JJ., 
concurring); Cole, supra, note 13 (Abella J., dissenting); St-Onge, supra, note 13 (Rothstein, 
Cromwell JJ., dissenting); Nedelcu, supra, note 13 (LeBel, Fish, Cromwell JJ., dissenting); Aucoin, 
supra, note 13 (LeBel, Fish JJ., dissenting); and S. (N.), supra, note 13 (LeBel, Rothstein JJ., 
concurring, and Abella J., dissenting). In the non-Charter cases it was unanimous in Doré, supra, 
note 17 (Abella J.); Bragg Communications, supra, note 17 (Abella J.); Moore, supra, note 17 
(Abella J.), and Downtown Eastside, supra, note 17 (Cromwell J.) but not in Ipeelee, supra, note 17 
(Rothstein J., dissenting) and Opitz, supra, note 17 (McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel, Fish JJ., dissenting). 
As for early 2013, it was divided in Quebec v. A., supra, note 18 (Deschamps, Cromwell, 
Karatkatsanis, Abella JJ.), and Manitoba Métis, supra, note 18 (Rothstein, Moldaver JJ., dissenting) 
but unanimous in Whatcott, supra, note 10. 
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unanimous opinion. If consensus reflects favourably on the Court and its 
leadership, solidarity also means that a conception of the Charter and its 
rights carries the endorsement of the institution. Though the assumption 
may be stronger or weaker for case-specific reasons, it is often thought 
that unanimous opinions speak with greater authority and bear more 
weight as precedent. With that in mind, the Court’s solidarity in R. v. 
Khawaja40 and Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott is 
puzzling, but indicative, as well, of the McLachlin Court’s limited insight 
on the fundamental freedoms, and more generally of its current approach 
to rights protection.41  
III. CHARTER BELLWETHERS 
Two cases stand out as bellwethers: despite raising critical issues 
about the permissibility of heavy restrictions on section 2’s funda-
mental freedoms, both dismissed the Charter claim by unanimous 
decision. R. v. Khawaja considered the motive clause in the Criminal 
Code’s anti-terrorism provisions, which has been a lightning rod for 
concerns that individuals could be singled out for investigation and 
prosecution on the basis of assumptions about their willingness to 
support or engage in terrorist acts. Meanwhile, against the backdrop 
of close divisions in earlier decisions and extensive debate in the in-
terim, Whatcott asked whether the McLachlin Court would protect 
expressive freedom, or subordinate it to the anti-discrimination objec-
tives of human rights legislation. 
R. v. Khawaja tested the constitutionality of the Criminal Code’s 
threshold definition of terrorist activity and criminalization of “religious, 
political or ideological” motives.42 Khawaja was not the first time the 
Court considered Parliament’s post 9/11 package of anti-terrorism laws. 
In 2004, a majority upheld section 83.28’s investigative hearing mecha-
nism, but did so against two dissenting opinions joined by three members 
of the Court.43 At the same time, the Court issued a second decision in 
                                                                                                             
40 Supra, note 9. 
41 Supra, note 10. 
42 Supra, note 9. Section 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) defines terrorist activity as an act or omission 
that is committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or 
cause”. Criminal Code, supra, note 8. 
43 Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 
248 (S.C.C.) (LeBel, Fish JJ., dissenting on the constitutionality of the provision; LeBel, Fish, 
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Vancouver Sun, which undermined the provision’s feasibility by impos-
ing a presumption of openness on all investigative hearings.44 This 
requirement made it substantially more difficult, if not practically impos-
sible, for these hearings to be held; the Court was sharply divided, as a 
result, in deciding between the Charter and law enforcement objectives.45 
Like the motive clause, the provisions for investigative hearings and pre-
ventive detention were hotly debated when anti-terrorism legislation was 
enacted, and again at the time of its five-year review.46 Though the 
McLachlin Court’s decisions on investigative hearings reflected that 
broader debate in disagreements among the judges, its response to the  
motive clause was quite different. In 2012, the Court dismissed Khawaja’s 
Charter challenge by unanimous decision.47  
Alongside section 7 claims that also failed, Khawaja required the 
Court to consider definitional overreach in the Criminal Code’s anti-
terrorism provisions, and its consequences for section 2’s fundamental 
freedoms.48 The motive clause, which is a pivot in the definition of ter-
rorist activity, spawned an amendment even before the legislation was 
enacted in 2001.49 At the time of five-year review, the Senate Report rec-
ommended that it be repealed, and the Arar Inquiry commented 
extensively on the issue of profiling.50 The fear around this clause is that 
authorities can use its identifiers to target individuals who might be exer-
cising protected constitutional rights. Its value in the war on terrorism 
                                                                                                             
Binnie JJ., dissenting on the ground that the investigative hearing had been used for an inappropriate 
purpose in the Air India investigation). 
44 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.).  
45 Bastarache J., with Deschamps J. concurring, wrote a strong dissent in this case. 
46 See Bill 7, Combating Terrorism Act, S.C. 2013, c. 9 (reinstating investigative hearings 
and preventive detention provisions for another five-year period). 
47 Khawaja was decided by a panel of seven, with Deschamps and Moldaver JJ. not 
participating in the appeal. 
48 For comment on the Court’s s. 7 discussion see H. Stewart, “R. v. Khawaja: At the Limits 
of Fundamental Justice” in Constitutional Cases 2012, supra, note 5; P. Sankoff, “Khawaja: Mixed 
Messages on the Meaning of Intention, Purpose and Desire” (2013) 97 C.R. (6th) 280. 
49 See s. 83.01(1.1), which narrowed the scope of the clause by stating, “for greater 
certainty”, that expression covered by the clause is not terrorist activity unless it also constitutes an 
act or omission that otherwise satisfies the criteria of s. 83.01(1)(b) (i.e., which lists a series of 
violent acts). 
50 Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act, Fundamental Justice in 
Extraordinary Times, February 2007, Recommendation 3; see also, at 18-29 (acknowledging and 
discussing concerns about profiling and targeting after hearing from numerous witnesses on this 
issue). K. Roach, “Terrorism Offences and the Charter: A Comment on R. v. Khawaja” (2007) 
11 Can. Crim. L.R. 271, at 289 (citing the Arar Report’s comments on profiling). 
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has been questioned and debated at length in the years since 2001.51 
Though the trial judge found the motive clause unconstitutional and sev-
ered it from the provision, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed that 
decision.52 
Against that pedigree of controversy, the Supreme Court held in 
Khawaja that the clause does not violate the Charter. Section 83.01’s ref-
erences to political, religious and ideological objectives automatically 
engaged section 2(a) and (b), but also implicated section 2(d)’s guarantee 
of associational freedom. Despite the sweep across section 2’s fundamen-
tal freedoms, the Chief Justice’s majority opinion began by reading 
religious and associational freedom out of the appeal. Doing so rendered 
those freedoms invisible and minimized the scale of interference with 
fundamental freedoms. In effect, section 2’s other guarantees were sub-
sidiary to expressive freedom and became redundant, or irrelevant, once 
the section 2(b) claim failed.53  
Read on its own, the motive clause strikes at the core of expressive 
freedom by criminalizing political, religious and ideological purposes, ob-
jectives and causes. For that reason, the clause per se and on its face 
violates section 2(b). Under longstanding doctrine, purposeful violations of 
expressive freedom are prima facie in breach of the guarantee, and shift 
without more to section 1 for justification.54 That conclusion did not follow 
in Khawaja because of the violence exception, which excludes acts and 
threats of violence from section 2(b).55 Accordingly, the Chief Justice re-
lied on that exception to skirt the question of purposeful violation and 
decide, without hesitation, that the conduct caught by the terrorism provi-
sions falls within the exception.56 Certain language in other parts of the 
definition raised lingering concerns that non-violent or constitutionally 
                                                                                                             
51 Some countries have such clauses and others do not (i.e., the U.S., UN and European 
nations). In Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court 
adopted its own definition of terrorism which did not include any element of this kind.  
52 R. v. Khawaja, [2010] O.J. No. 5471, 103 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Khawaja (C.A.)”]; [2006] O.J. No. 4245, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
53 Khawaja, supra, note 9, at para. 66 (concluding that there is no s. 2(a) or s. 2(d) claim if 
s. 2(b) is not infringed). 
54 Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”] (establishing the two-step purpose and effects test for breach 
under s. 2(b)). 
55 Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, at para. 28 (S.C.C.) (commenting on the violence exception). 
56 Khawaja, supra, note 9, at para. 71 (stating that “[m]ost of the conduct caught by the 
terrorism provisions ... concern acts of violence or threats of violence” and the “conduct falls outside 
the protection of s. 2(b))”. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE MCLACHLIN COURT AND THE CHARTER IN 2012 27 
protected activity might be at risk. In response to that concern, the Chief 
Justice kept the Charter issue hypothetically alive for the clause that targets 
activities causing serious interference or disruption.57  
The motive clause criminalizes purposes, objectives and causes that 
are abstract in the definition, but inescapably content-based in their ap-
plication. The clause does not explicitly address acts or threats of 
violence, but rather throws a dragnet over “motives” which, apart from 
any act of violence, are constitutionally protected. In such circumstances, 
it is troubling that the Chief Justice’s analysis of purposeful violation was 
perfunctory, and did not ask whether the motive clause itself is caught by the 
violence exception, and excluded from section 2(b) on that basis. Nor did the 
Chief Justice mention, much less analyze, whether section 83.01(1.1)  
resolved concerns that the clause draws no distinction between protected 
and unprotected, or violent and non-violent purposes, objectives, and 
causes.58 The Charter might permit the state to lever the definition of 
terrorist activity by striking at constitutionally protected activity, but 
surely only after it meets its burden under section 1 to demonstrate that 
the motive clause is a justifiable and proportionate element of the 
Code’s definition of terrorist activity. 
Ignoring the motive clause’s purposeful violation of section 2(b) ac-
tivated the guarantee’s alternative route to section 1, which considers 
whether a provision impermissibly affects section 2(b).59 There, the Chief 
Justice followed the lead of the Ontario Court of Appeal and essentially 
adopted its reasons for rejecting a breach based on chilling effects, 
though with less analysis in doing so. Reasons that are also perfunctory 
on this issue indicate that the Court did not give the argument from chill 
much credence. The Chief Justice disagreed with the Ontario Court of 
Appeal that chill must always be proved by evidence, but then went on to 
                                                                                                             
57 Id., at para. 74 (stating that the activities caught by s. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) of the Criminal 
Code, supra, note 8 — the interference and disruption clause — do not fall within the protected zone 
of free expression, without ruling out the possibility that the provision could in some future case 
capture protected activity). 
58 Although s. 83.01(1.1), id., appears to narrow the scope of the motive clause, its 
constitutionality remains unclear, both because this provision fails to disentangle the proscribed 
“acts or omission” — which are forms of conduct — from purely expressive activities, and also 
because it assumes the constitutionality of the acts and omissions described in the paragraph (i.e., 
that the criteria, as set out, cannot catch non-violent expressive activities). Khawaja mentioned it 
only in discussion of the motive clause’s chilling effects and not on the question of purposeful 
violation; Khawaja, supra, note 9, at para. 82 (discounting a chilling effect because “[a]nyone who 
reads the entire provision” will take notice of s. 83.01(1.1) and its narrowing scope). 
59 Irwin Toy, supra, note 54.  
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apply a double standard and state that, in this case, evidence of a connec-
tion between the clause and a chill was nonetheless required.60  
From there, she adopted the three reasons the appellate court gave for 
dismissing the chilling effects claim. First, the Chief Justice agreed that 
any negative impact on the fundamental freedoms is related to 9/11 and its 
aftermath, and not to the motive clause.61 In effect, this sent a message that 
the state is entitled to capitalize on a climate of suspicion, and escalate or 
aggravate an existing chill by criminalizing activity that has already been 
marginalized. Second, she held that the legislation is not responsible if 
groups or individuals self-censor, or are deterred from exercising their 
fundamental freedoms. In her view, the chill in those circumstances can 
only stem from their flawed understanding of the legislation, and 
unfounded fear that it might apply to legitimate, non-violent activity.62 In 
other words, any such chilling is self-generated or self-inflicted, and not 
linked to the provision’s express targeting of motive. Finally, the Chief 
Justice emphasized that profiling is not a concern either, because any 
targeting by authorities can only occur through police misconduct.63 Under 
that view, the motive clause is not accountable for problems that arise, 
because it neither authorizes nor invites authorities to exercise powers that 
are illegal or unconstitutional.64 
It is difficult to imagine how Khawaja could be less sympathetic to 
the Charter’s fundamental freedoms and to activities which — being po-
litical, religious and ideological in nature — sit at the core of the 
guarantee. Though the definition of terrorist activity was controversial 
from the outset, little in the Court’s opinion acknowledges, much less 
                                                                                                             
60 Khawaja, supra, note 9, at paras. 79-80 (acknowledging that the chilling effect can “be 
inferred from known facts and experience”, then agreeing with the Ontario C.A. that an inference of 
chill from the motive clause cannot be drawn without evidence). 
61 Id., at para. 81. The Ontario Court of Appeal put the point in blunt terms, stating that “[i]t 
is hardly surprising that, in the public mind, terrorism is associated with the religious and political 
views of radical Islamists” and “[n]or is it surprising that some extend that association to all who fit 
within a very broad racial and cultural stereotype of a radical Islamist”; Khawaja (C.A), supra, note 
52, at para. 126. 
62 Id., at para. 82 (stating that the clause would only have a chilling effect on those who 
have “cursory or incomplete knowledge of s. 83.01”, and that only individuals who go well beyond 
legitimate expression need fear liability under these provisions). See also Khawaja (C.A.), id., 
at para. 128 (imposing a burden on individuals — in avoiding self-censoring — to be aware of 
s. 83.01(1.1) and its narrowing of the motive clause). 
63 Id., at para. 83. 
64 Id. (stating, without reservation, that the clause raises “no concerns with respect to 
improper stereotyping”). See also Khawaja (C.A.), supra, note 52, at paras. 132-135 (concluding 
that if there is any chill its source is the actions of terrorists, and not the legislation). 
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confronts or addresses, those concerns. The Court made little or no effort 
to explain the role of the motive clause in the framework of complex 
anti-terrorism provisions, or to consider the relationship between the mo-
tive clause and section 83.01(1.1). The majority opinion blanked the 
question of purposeful violation out, and did not offer an interpretation or 
warning to narrow the motive clause’s reach (i.e., stressing, for example, 
that it only applies in limited circumstances where the violence criteria 
are satisfied). The McLachlin Court is known for its diligence in reading 
statutory provisions carefully, noting whatever reservations or qualifica-
tions are necessary to ensure compliance with the Charter. Its failure to 
do so in Khawaja likely shows that the Court did not consider section 2’s 
fundamental freedoms to be truly at risk under the Code’s definition of 
terrorist activity. 
After negating the question of purposeful violation with a reflexive 
turn to the violence exception, the Court dismissed the impact on consti-
tutionally protected activities by shifting responsibility for chilling ef-
fects from lawmakers to 9/11 itself, to groups or individuals who self-
censor because they misunderstand the clause, and to those in authority 
who might engage in profiling, because they also misunderstand and 
misconstrue powers that are conferred by the clause. It is disheartening 
that no member of the panel saw a breach of the Charter’s fundamental 
freedoms, or a need, at the very least, to put the government to the test of 
justification under section 1.  
A few months after Khawaja, the Court dismissed the claim in What-
cott, once again by unanimous vote. To the extent the Court may have 
been particularly compelled to defer to Parliament’s judgment in enact-
ing anti-terrorism measures, an appeal to deference was less convincing 
in Whatcott.65  
In the context of flyers attacking gays and their visibility in public 
schools, Whatcott asked whether anti-discrimination laws can be used to 
regulate offensive expression.66 Though the Court’s decision reads on its 
                                                                                                             
65 On other terrorism-related issues compare Suresh v. Canada, supra, note 51 (deportation 
proceedings); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 
2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”] (security certificate, s. 7 fairness); Canada (Justice) 
v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) (s. 7 disclosure); and Canada (Prime 
Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.) (remedy). 
66 Supra, note 10. Section 14(1)(b) prohibits the publication or display of any representation 
“that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any 
person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground”: Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, 
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1. 
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face as a draw, section 2(b) only prevailed on the obvious points of over-
breadth and otherwise lost on the question of principle. Whatcott upheld 
section 14(1)(b) of Saskatchewan’s human rights legislation, but read it 
down and read out certain words that unjustifiably infringe expressive 
freedom.67 Compromise on the question of law was followed by a sec-
ond compromise, which found that while two of the flyers violated 
section 14, two others were protected by expressive freedom.  
In this way, Whatcott presents on the surface as a balanced decision, 
one that weighed equality values and expressive freedom carefully be-
fore reaching a well-calibrated conclusion: that while expression is 
subject to human rights legislation, the freedom to state offensive and 
hurtful views is protected from overreaching views of equality’s de-
mands. Despite or in light of that balance, Whatcott must be seen as a 
signal defeat for section 2(b). The Court’s correction of section 14 was 
modest, as the provision had already been read down judicially to com-
ply with the definition of hate speech under the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence. Moreover, by 2012, there were no vestiges of the close 
margins and deep divisions which defined the Court’s hate speech trilogy 
from the 1990s. In striking contrast, the Whatcott panel unanimously 
adopted Rothstein J.’s majority opinion.68  
Though scarcely evident in that opinion, the backdrop is critical, for 
it shows what was at stake. Whether hate speech should be protected by 
the Charter and left to counter speech and the counsels of time, or regu-
lated to avoid the risk that it might be believed and acted on, has posed 
one of modern expressive freedom’s most difficult issues. As divisive 
today as it was 20-some years ago, debate on this issue has hardly 
abated. To the contrary, though with ebb and flow, the status of hate 
speech regulation has raged on, even as Whatcott reached the Court. Not 
only have there been high profile decisions and well-publicized reports in 
recent years, Parliament has repealed section 13, which was the Cana-
dian Human Rights Act’s69 hate speech provision.70  
                                                                                                             
67 Id., at para. 92 (finding that s. 14’s prohibition on expression that “ridicules, belittles, or 
affronts the dignity” of those protected from discrimination fails the rational connection test) and 
para. 206 (severing those words from the provision); see also paras. 41-42 (reading down the 
doctrinal definition of hate speech); and paras. 55-60 (confirming a “modified” definition of hatred). 
68 Whatcott was decided by a panel of six, which comprised McLachlin C.J.C., with LeBel, 
Fish, Abella, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Justice Deschamps sat on the panel but did not participate 
in the decision. 
69 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
70 Though the references could be countless in number, see especially Richard Moon, 
Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian Human 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE MCLACHLIN COURT AND THE CHARTER IN 2012 31 
When it addressed the Charter status of hate speech for the first time, 
the Court upheld Criminal Code and human rights provisions as reason-
able limits on section 2(b), by margins of 4-3 in each instance.71 Soon 
after Keegstra and Taylor in 1990, the Court went the other way, and pro-
tected expressive freedom in R. v. Zundel — in a different statutory 
context, though on the related issue of holocaust denial — and again, by 
a 4-3 margin.72 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Keegstra and Taylor 
were of transcending importance because they marked a turning point in 
the section 2(b) jurisprudence.73 Taken together, this trilogy of landmarks 
speaks to the raw conflicts these issues exposed, and how the panels 
wrestled with them in deciding Zundel differently than Keegstra and  
Taylor; the result was closely reasoned majority and dissenting opinions 
in all three.74 Even as the panel changed in R. v. Zundel, drawing other 
members of the Court into the debate, the balance of equilibrium — going 
first one way and then the other — could not have been closer.75 
Whatcott provided the opportunity for the 2012 Court to revisit the 
status of hate speech from the vantage of fresh insight, developments, 
and perspective. Disappointingly, its response shows how much ground 
section 2(b) has lost in the interim. Justice Rothstein neither recognized 
                                                                                                             
Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate Speech on the Internet (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, 2008) [hereinafter “Moon Report”]; and Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian 
Human Rights Act (Protecting Freedom), 1st Sess, 41st Parl., 2011 (Royal Assent on June 26, 2013, 
repealing s. 13 as of June 26, 2014). See also Zwibel, supra, note 18 (reviewing the key 
developments).  
71 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Keegstra”]; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”].  
72 R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Zundel”] 
(invalidating the false news provision of the Criminal Code). 
73 Not only did the Court decide against expressive freedom in each, in doing so it 
developed a s. 1 methodology that made it easier to uphold limits on offensive expression and was 
applied in other cases to justify restrictions on a range of so-called “low value” expression — 
expression that strayed from the “core” of s. 2(b)’s guarantee. 
74 Chief Justice Dickson wrote majority opinions in Keegstra and Taylor, and McLachlin J. 
wrote dissents. In Zundel, McLachlin J. was author of the majority opinion and Cory and Iacobucci 
JJ. the dissent. 
75 The Dickson majority in Keegstra and Taylor comprised the Chief Justice, together with 
Wilson, L’Heureux Dubé and Gonthier JJ.; the McLachlin minority included Justices Sopinka and 
La Forest. The panel in Zundel was differently constituted with McLachlin J. together with La 
Forest, L’Heureux Dubé and Sopinka JJ. in the majority, and Cory and Iacobucci JJ., joined by 
Gonthier J., in the minority. While Lamer J. did not participate in any of these cases, L’Heureux 
Dubé J. changed her vote from Keegstra and Taylor to Zundel. In 2012, McLachlin J. — now 
McLachlin C.J.C. — was the only member of the Court from these panels to serve again in 
Whatcott. 
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nor discussed the opinions in the trilogy that defended expressive free-
dom, though then McLachlin J. played a leading role in all three. Against 
the debates that define the Keegstra-Taylor-Zundel trio, Whatcott’s fail-
ure to canvass any alternative view is striking, and the majority opinion 
also chose not to review or discuss significant developments in the in-
terim.76 In the circumstances, the silence is remarkable: Rothstein J.’s 
opinion did not provoke a whisper of dissent, or concurring remarks of 
any kind from other members of the panel.  
By seemingly staking the middle ground, Rothstein J. made anti-
discrimination law the victor in Whatcott. For present purposes, limited 
comments only will be made.77 A first considers whether, and under what 
view of the Charter, that middle ground was open, and a second com-
ments on the decision’s unanimity. A brief analysis shows that the 
existing methodology compromised section 2(b), and that Whatcott not 
only endorsed that methodology but took it a step further, thereby weak-
ening expressive freedom yet more in the process. By agreeing, other 
members of the panel acquiesced in a view of section 2(b) that more 
deeply embedded its low status in the jurisprudence.  
Justice Rothstein’s characterization of the regulation and concept of 
harm are the keys to his section 2(b) methodology. To begin, he made the 
essential claim that hate speech regulations do not target ideas. Without 
invoking the vocabulary of content neutrality, he maintained that the vio-
lation of expressive freedom is not content-based, and cannot be 
considered a form of censorship. Despite agreeing that “[a] blanket pro-
hibition on the communication of repugnant ideas would offend the core 
of freedom of expression”, he declared that “[h]ate speech legislation is 
not aimed at discouraging repugnant or offensive ideas”.78 The logic is 
that limits on ideas would offend section 2(b)’s core, but restrictions on 
hate speech are different, because they only attack the “mode of expres-
sion” and “effect” hate speech may have.79 To repeat, Rothstein J. was 
adamant that Saskatchewan’s human rights provision regulates the mode 
and effect of the message, and not its content. Whatcott’s pretense, then, 
                                                                                                             
76 He cites the Moon Report, supra, note 70 once; Whatcott, supra, note 10, at para. 105. 
77 For more detailed comments on Whatcott, see Freiman and Zwibel, supra, note 18. 
78 Whatcott, supra, note 10, at paras. 50 and 51 (emphasis added). 
79 Id., at para 51 (noting, with emphasis, the conjectural nature of the harm). See also para. 
58 (stating, once more, that the repugnancy of the ideas is not sufficient to justify restrictions and 
declaring that the prohibition of hate speech “is not designed to censor ideas or to compel anyone to 
think ‘correctly’”). 
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is that the content of hate speech is protected, though the mode of ex-
pressing it — hatefully — is not. 
Yet Justice Rothstein’s section 1 discussion confirms that his concept 
of hate speech is content based. There, he relied on the Keegstra-Taylor 
methodology, beginning with the proposition that “not all expression will 
be treated equally”, and concluding that “[h]ate speech is at some dis-
tance from the spirit of s. 2(b) because it does little to promote, and can 
in fact impede, the values underlying freedom of expression”.80 The 
methodology from the early 1990s invoked the “core” and “spirit” of 
section 2(b) not, as might be expected, to enhance expressive freedom’s 
protection, but instead to permit limits whenever the content of a mes-
sage could be described as having low value. Though Rothstein J. did not 
explicitly characterize the content at issue in Whatcott as low value, de-
scribing hate speech laws as neutral — in being aimed at modes and 
effects rather than messages — represents a serious retreat from content 
neutrality.81 This is how he circumvented the organizing principle that is 
so entrenched in the section 2(b) jurisprudence. It is true enough that the 
Court’s commitment to content neutrality is little more than a formality, 
having been vanquished by section 1’s content-based, core values ap-
proach; still, the principle was a fundamental tenet of section 2(b) prior 
to Whatcott.82 
The assertion that Saskatchewan’s human rights provision only tar-
gets hate speech’s effects is directly related to Rothstein J.’s concept of 
harm. His distinction between offensive messages is based on a curious 
and unsupported assumption that hate speech has insidious effects, but 
merely repugnant and offensive messages do not. In other words, What-
cott proposed that hate speech can be defined and regulated on an 
exceptional basis because of its distinctive effects.83  
                                                                                                             
80 Id., at paras. 112 and 114 (emphasis added). 
81 Irwin Toy, supra, note 54 (establishing content neutrality and the equal status of all ideas 
for purposes of determining the question of a s. 2(b) breach). 
82 See J. Cameron, “A Reflection on Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey: 1982-2012”, in 
Constitutional Cases 2011, supra, note 3, at 163 (explaining the contradictory and incoherent nature 
of the Court’s commitment to content neutrality under s. 2(b) and application of an explicitly 
content-based, core values methodology under s. 1). 
83 According to Rothstein J., the distinction is between “mere disdain or dislike”, “merely 
discrediting, humiliating or offending the victims” and repugnant and offensive ideas, on the one 
hand, and “[r]epresentations that expose a target group to detestation [and] tend to inspire enmity 
and extreme ill-will against them” or “incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection 
that risks causing discrimination or other harmful effects”. Whatcott, supra, note 10, at paras. 41, 57 
and 58. 
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Though one is dominant, Rothstein J.’s concept of harm has two 
branches. Primarily, his view of harm is preventive and finds voice in 
repeated references to the harm hate speech could or can cause, if and 
when its messages are acted on and take the form of discriminatory con-
duct.84 In other words, he does not state that hate speech is per se 
harmful, but instead finds that it may become an instrument of harm, if 
and when discriminatory acts are committed by a third party. Harm, in 
this view, is speculative, prospective, and essentially contingent in na-
ture. The problem is that grounding limits in a risk of harm that is 
unknown — a form of harm in the making — places section 2(b) in jeop-
ardy any time it is perceived that a message could lead to an act of harm 
in the future. Notably, the act that might occur is not committed by the 
speaker, but by others who engage in discriminatory behaviour. In this 
way, Rothstein J.’s concept of harm assumes that an actor who commits a 
subsequent discriminatory act was inspired by the speaker and, therefore, 
that the speaker can be held accountable preventively through the office 
of section 14. 
He otherwise cited the social harm arising from hate speech, refer-
ring generally to “social disharmony” and “the need to protect the 
societal standing of vulnerable groups”.85 He spoke of its impact on tar-
get groups, claiming that it poses “a serious barrier to their full 
participation in our democracy”, cuts off any reply by the group under 
attack, and forces the group to “argue for their basic humanity or social 
standing”.86 Despite these mentions, Rothstein J. remained true to his 
primary concept of harm as the prospect or likelihood that third parties 
might act on hate speech. As he explained, the “concern is that some 
members of society will demonstrate their rejection of the vulnerable 
group through conduct”.87  
                                                                                                             
84 See id., among others, at paras. 2 (referring to expression which represents a “potential 
cause of the discriminatory practices the human rights legislation seeks to eliminate”); 48 (referring 
to prohibitions that aim to eliminate expression that has “the potential to incite or inspire 
discriminatory treatment” and is “likely to expose a protected group to hatred and potentially lead to 
the activity the legislature seeks to eliminate”); 52 (referring, again, to expression with the 
“potential” to lead to discrimination); 74 (stating that hate speech “lays the groundwork for later, 
broad attacks on vulnerable groups”); 82 and 92 (discussing the likely effects of hate speech) and 
111 (referring, again, to expression which, “by inspiring hatred, has the potential to cause the type of 
harm the legislature is trying to prevent”) (emphasis added in all instances). 
85 Id., at paras. 74 and 82. 
86 Id., at para. 75. 
87 Id., at para. 74 (noting, by emphasis added, the change in verb tense). 
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This definition of harm made it impossible for the Court to require 
proof, as none is available to support a hypothetical view of harm. The 
Court did not refer to evidence that hate speech leads to discriminatory 
acts or conduct by third parties, and the societal harm Rothstein J. spoke 
of was little more than a claim or argument, not supported by evidence. 
His methodology of reasonable limits relied instead on common sense, 
and he considered it sufficient simply to declare that “the discriminatory 
effects of hate speech are part of the everyday knowledge and experience 
of Canadians”.88 He also invoked the Court’s default under section 1, of 
deferring to the legislature when enforcing the Charter is undesirable.89  
In concluding that hate speech is not protected by the Charter,  
Rothstein J. reverted to the Keegstra-Taylor methodology, which paired 
judicial assessment of expressive merit with an attenuated concept of 
harm. This combination became the means, in the 1990s and beyond, by 
which the Court upheld virtually all limits on expressive activity, 
including political as well as offensive expression.90 Rather than re-
think it in light of intervening debates about hate speech and expressive 
freedom more generally, Rothstein J. not only reverted to that 
methodology, but further diminished section 2(b) by denying that hate 
speech laws target content. It is telling of expressive freedom’s low status 
at the Court that no member of the panel challenged this analysis, and 
especially unfortunate that the Court rejected an evidence-based concept 
of harm. In doing so, the McLachlin Court missed an opportunity to 
remind the federal government — and others — that limits on Charter 
rights and freedoms are supposed to be evidence-based. 
Nor did Whatcott’s middle-ground disposition salve the conse-
quences for expressive freedom. The Court’s insistence that the provision 
does not target ideas and that subjectivity has been eliminated is belied 
by the outcome, which showed how little agreement there was on the 
transgressive nature of the Whatcott flyers. The human rights tribunal 
and reviewing judge found that all four flyers violated the human rights 
                                                                                                             
88 Id., at para. 135. See also para. 132 (stating that “a precise causal link for certain societal 
harms ought not to be required” and that a court is “entitled to use common sense and experience in 
recognizing that certain activities , hate speech among them, inflict harm”). 
89 Id., at para. 78 (stating that the legislature’s approach must be accorded considerable 
deference; emphasis added). 
90 See, e.g., Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
827 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) (upholding 
restrictions on political expression which sits at the core of s. 2(b), without proof or evidence of its 
harmful effects). 
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provision; the three-judge panel of the appellate court disagreed and 
found that none could be regulated; and the Supreme Court found, fi-
nally, that while two of the flyers did, two others did not.91 These 
proceedings demonstrate, yet again, that hate speech intractably and pre-
dictably defies objective measurement.  
Khawaja and Whatcott share elements in common. Both came to the 
Court amid threshold debates about limits on the Charter’s fundamental 
freedoms.92 The claim from freedom failed entirely in Khawaja, and then 
lost again at the level of principle in Whatcott. After concluding that the 
motive clause does not violate section 2(b), the Court claimed that hate 
speech regulations do not target the content of messages. Further indica-
tion of the Court’s resistance to the fundamental freedoms in these cases 
is found in its opportunistic treatment of evidence requirements. Kha-
waja rejected the section 2(b) claim because the appellant failed to lead 
evidence to show that the motive clause has had a chilling effect, despite 
such evidence not being required in other cases. A few months later, 
Whatcott all but relieved the government of its evidentiary burden to 
demonstrate that hate speech is harmful. What was readily assumed 
there, as a matter of “everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians”, 
was put to the proof under a different standard in the case of the motive 
clause. On this, the disconnect between the two is telling, because it 
shows how inconsistent approaches to the evidence worked consistently 
against expressive freedom. Though the outcome and methodology are 
profoundly disappointing, more discouraging yet is the lack of debate 
between members of the Court, at the level of transparency in judicial 
reasons.93  
As Nedelcu, Opitz, S. (N.) and Quebec v. A. attest, the Court’s 
disagreements in this review period offer a wealth of interpretive material. 
At the same time, its solidarity in Khawaja and Whatcott should not be 
overlooked, as consensus in closely watched cases sends an institutional 
message and projects a conception of rights that commands the 
                                                                                                             
91 Whatcott, supra, note 10, at paras. 13-18 (summarizing the proceedings in courts and 
tribunals below). 
92 Note that the hate speech in Whatcott was rooted in religious conviction; see Whatcott, 
id., at paras. 152-163 (rehearsing the s. 2(a) analysis and coming to the same conclusion). 
93 Most notable is the Chief Justice’s ongoing retreat from the leadership and courage she 
displayed in protecting the Charter when she joined the Court. In addition to Keegstra and Taylor 
(dissenting opinions) and Zundel (majority opinion), McLachlin J. showed early leadership on s. 2(b) 
issues in the search warrant cases; see Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 
87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.); and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney 
General), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (S.C.C.) (sole dissenting opinion). 
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institution’s endorsement. As for explanations, the Court’s unanimity can 
be traced to one or more of: the issues at stake, the record, the written and 
oral advocacy, the technicalities of the appeal, the size and composition of 
the panel, internal discussion and the leadership of the opinions’ authors. 
In qualitative terms, solidarity is facially neutral but, among other things, 
can reveal a diminished or enhanced conception of rights, a lack or 
presence of intellectual rigour and courage, and an institutional preference 
for a more diffident or more proactive conception of review.  
If the Charter is in stall, there may be little reason to fear that it will 
not rebound. For the time being, with fewer cases being decided there 
may be fewer losses and fewer negative Charter precedents created (at 
least if the success rates in the last three years are an indication). This 
year’s low success rate may be just as fortuitous as similar rates in 2010 
and 2011, and the lack of a Charter landmark in 2012 may also be 
thought fortuitous. Likewise, unanimity in Khawaja and Whatcott might 
not seem so striking in light of debate in other cases. 
Still, an unease remains which is based in an apprehension — despite 
the all’s well explanations that can be advanced — that the Charter has 
been slipping. As shadowy and unformed as it is, this uneasiness has 
stirred the reflection that ends this review. 
IV. THE CHARTER AND THE MIDDLE GROUND 
In his exit interview in 2011, Binnie J. remarked that the McLachlin 
Court is more of a consolidator than a “cutting-edge innovator”, then 
hastened to add, “[w]hich is not to say I see the court as timid”.94 He 
allowed that the Court is forceful when the occasion arises, but warned 
that “the legal landscape has changed and the court has evolved with the 
landscape”.95 In broad terms, his comments are consistent with a 2010 
interview of McLachlin C.J.C., which took place on her 10th anniversary 
as Chief Justice. She reflected generally that the Supreme Court “did a 
huge amount of very good work laying down the basis” in the Charter’s 
early years, and added that “[w]e are just building on that”.96 She also 
intimated that with “most of the significant Charter of rights battles 
[having] been fought”, the Court’s mission under her leadership is “to 
                                                                                                             
94 K. Makin, “Justice Ian Binnie’s Exit Interview”, September 23, 2011, The Globe and Mail. 
95 Id. 
96 K. Makin, “Ten Years as a Top Judge — And She Still Loses Sleep Over her Decisions”, 
January 7, 2010, The Globe and Mail, A1. 
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deal mainly with subtle interpretations”.97 The Chief Justice confirmed 
these views in a very recent interview, which quotes her as remarking 
that “[t]here are fewer issues now” that “the heady days of the 80s and 
early 90s” are over.98 She also expressed the view that most of the “big” 
Charter issues have been settled and the Court is now in a period of “fine 
tuning”.99 
There can be no doubt that subtle interpretation and fine tuning are 
enormously important. Without discounting that work, characterizing 
what is at stake in Charter decision-making is a matter of perception and 
choice. From one point of view, the violence exception was dispositive in 
Khawaja and the chilling effect was not established; from another, 
though, the Charter challenge was critical because the motive clause 
strikes at section 2’s core commitments. Similarly, Whatcott is more 
straightforward if the everyday experience and knowledge of Canadians 
can be deployed to override fundamental freedoms; seen otherwise, the 
status of hate speech in 2012 called for a deep look at the nature of free-
dom, what harm is in the context of discrimination, and the demands of 
risk management in a democracy.  
How the 2012 jurisprudence and the Charter’s prospects should be 
assessed also rest on perceptions and choices between alternative or 
overlapping explanations. The current dynamics may be fortuitous and 
untroubling, or not, depending on point of view. At the least, this review 
has confirmed a consistent downward trend on docket volume and suc-
cess rates at the Supreme Court; it has shown that 2012 was a year of 
substantive mediocrity for the Charter; and it has aired its concerns about 
key decisions being decided by unanimous opinion.100 That said, the 
longer view is of more interest than the outcome in particular cases. The 
Chief Justice is respected as a leader who values consensus, but whether 
consensus is desirable more generally is not the issue here, and nor are 
the 2012 particulars as to docket, panel composition and Charter output.  
Rather, the point for final reflection is that there are enough indica-
tors, in 2012 and in recent history, to hint that a deeper turn in the 
Charter’s evolution may be taking place. It is more like a gradual arc than 
a sharp turn, and does not emerge on a surface review of case-to-case and 
                                                                                                             
97 Id. 
98 J. Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, July 23, 2013, Canadian Lawyer, at 26. 
99 Id. 
100 Quebec v. A., supra, note 18, is another key decision which, as mentioned, exposed 
strong differences of opinion among the nine members of the Court. 
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year-by-year assessment. What is at stake is a retreat or turn away from 
the Charter we once imagined and experienced, as a nimble document 
and an instrument of progress. Lately and increasingly, it seems instead 
that the Charter is stuck in the middle, implacable and passive for the 
most part, except when compelled on rare occasions to act on its prom-
ises. This shift is subtle, not only because the middle ground was 
available from the start, but also because rights protection under the 
Charter remains a force. Still, it is as though the Charter’s first principles 
are being reversed, in at least some instances: though the Court once took 
pride in announcing that rights are the rule and limits the exception, the 
language and methodology of limits are more the norm now, and rights 
protection more the exception. To clarify, this is less a description of the 
jurisprudence or of Charter outcomes in this or recent years than an ob-
servation about how vocabulary and perception have shifted the 
momentum and emphasis in Charter interpretation.  
In the post-1982 boom, the Supreme Court stepped up, addressing 
seemingly obvious and egregious Charter violations — often boldly — 
and setting standards for Charter compliance in a number of landmark 
decisions. Yet the Chief Justice and others take the view today that the 
transformational energy of those early years has been depleted, and there 
is not so much left for the courts to do. Being satisfied that Canada’s 
primary shortcomings on rights compliance have been redressed makes 
complacency about the Charter a less troubling choice at this point. Un-
der that view it follows, now the deep thinking on rights has been done 
and is in the past, that balancing rights and limits is a different exercise. 
The grand pronouncements give way to fine tuning and subtle interpreta-
tion. Deference to the legislatures is more standard when issues do not 
present conflicts in principle but sit, instead, in the margin of apprecia-
tion. Presenting differences of opinion that way may mean that 
reasonable limits will typically prevail over rights protection. Mean-
while, the legislatures have grown savvy over the years and gained 
confidence in their ability to Charter-proof statutes, legislating to the lim-
its of Charter compliance without having to invoke section 33. Still, it is 
an open question whether the federal government’s legislative agenda — 
which disowns evidence-based policymaking — will provoke a resur-
gence of vigilance on questions of rights protection. 
From the start, the Charter enjoyed immense support from courts, 
advocates and the public, but also had detractors and critics. Many who 
resisted the Charter remained voluble, and were joined by others who 
took up the cause of defending parliamentary tradition and democratic 
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capacity from the accretion of power to the courts under the Charter. The 
Charter jurisprudence under the Dickson and Lamer administrations 
opened up new debates about institutional relations which challenged the 
legitimacy of review and the Court’s power to speak on the compelling 
issues of the day. As the halcyon days of “dialogue” showed, the over-
ride’s bluff did not have to be called for section 33 to affect institutional 
relations.101 If the Court was determined not to provoke its use, the legis-
latures were almost as averse to enacting laws, notwithstanding the 
Charter. Yet it has psychological effects, and the override — together 
with other structural elements — exert a gravitational pull back to the 
middle.102 That pull is embedded in the history of the Charter and the 
structural indecision of that critical moment, when constitutional rights 
and parliamentary supremacy were partnered in the same document. Late 
in 1981, the choice was between a middle-ground Charter and no Charter 
at all. 
As a matter of text, the balance between rights enforcement and de-
mocratic limits — sections 33 and 1’s offsets to constitutional, judicial, 
and rights supremacy — is the Charter’s hallmark, its professed gen-
ius.103 Discovering that middle ground is Canada’s proclamation, its 
boast, to the world of constitutionalism.104 The academic community has 
invoked that genius to promote a view of the Charter as a template or 
model for other experiments in transformative constitutionalism. Some of 
the jurisdictions that adopted bills of rights after 1982 even improved on 
the Charter, with further corrections in favour of parliamentary supremacy 
                                                                                                             
101 See generally P. Hogg & A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 
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102 See J. Cameron, “The Charter’s Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the 
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103 See generally B. Berger & J. Cameron, eds., “Rights Constitutionalism and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. (special issue). 
104 Parliamentary and judicial supremacy were traditionally thought of as incompatible 
opposites. As Marshall C.J. explained, in rationalizing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, at 175 (1803), “[t]he constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable 
when the legislature shall please to alter it”. “Between these alternatives”, he pronounced, “there is 
no middle ground.” 
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and mechanisms to support democratic capacity.105 In this way, Canada is 
credited with leading the way in the move to a middle ground between 
parliamentary supremacy and constitutional or judicial supremacy.106  
If that is our contribution to rights constitutionalism, the question it 
raises for Canada today is whether there can be too much middle ground. 
The embedded structures of equilibrium, compromise, and balance may 
cramp the Charter’s entitlements and stunt its growth in today’s post-
transformational iteration of rights protection. From that frame of refer-
ence, it is worth asking whether the features we celebrate and export to 
others have made us cautious, to a fault. And it is also worth asking 
whether the Charter is in a space today that speaks too much the lan-
guage of caution. At the same time, the compromises that gave birth to 
the Charter may argue, with merit, that the middle ground — defined by 
an organic relationship between rights and limits — is the Charter’s des-
tiny. In this view, the structural partnership of rights and limits, and 
institutional dialogue meets the expectations of legal and political cul-
ture, and suits a constitutional tradition that values balance over rigid 
principle and ideological choice. That perspective casts the early period 
of transformational energy in a different light, making it the exception, 
rather than the norm, in Charter narrative.  
The purpose of this review has been to demonstrate that the “big” 
Charter issues are alive, both at the level of decision-making on cases 
that present themselves annually to the Court, and at the deeper level of 
reflecting on and mapping the Charter’s place in legal and political cul-
ture. In simple terms, it is a matter of seeing those issues and being open 
to discussion and debate about the challenges they raise. What is trou-
bling and disappointing is the McLachlin Court’s yeoman-like 
jurisprudence, and its failure to seize the moment, in the Charter’s 
30th anniversary year, to see the “big” and speak in any profound way of 
the Charter’s promises.  
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Dominance When Interpreting Rights?” (2004) 82 Texas L. Rev. 1963 and “Parliamentary Bills of 
Rights” (2006) 69 Mod. L. Rev. 7 (explaining the Charter’s role in promoting the emergence of a 
“parliamentary rights model” in countries such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and now some 
Australian states). 
106 See Law & Versteeg, supra, note 2, at 809-23 (discussing Canada’s constitutional 
influence, under the heading, Is Canada a Constitutional Superpower?). 
 
 
